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Collaborative effort to share resources is a significant feature of pervasive computing environments. To 
achieve secure service discoveay and sharing, and to distinguish between malevolent and benevolent 
entities, trust models must be defined. It is critical to estimate a device's initial tmst value because of the 
transient nature of pervasive smart space; however, most of the prior rese;~rch work on trust models for 
pervasive applications used the notion of constm~t initinl trust assignment. In this paper, we design nnd 
implement a trust model called DIRT. We categorize services in different secuaity levels and depending on 
the service requester's COtltext infonuation, we calculote the initia l tmst value. Our trust value is assigned 
for each device and for each service. Our overall tmst estimation for a service depends on the 
recommendations of the neighbouring devices, inference from other sca.vice-trust values for that device, 
and direct tniSt e~tperiencc. We provide an ex tensive survey of related work, nnd we demonstrate the 
distinguishing features of our proposed model with respect to the existing models. We implement a 
healthcare-monitoring application and a location-based service prototype over D.IRT. We also provide a 
perfonnnnce analysis of the model with respect to some of its important charactclistics tested in valious 
scenarios. 
Key II'Ords: Pervasive computing, lmst model, security level 
1 Iutroclnction 
Heterogeneous, portable, lightweight devices like PDAs, cell phones, and smart phones communicate 
in a pervasive smart space. Collaborative efforts to sbare resources J1elp these devices overcome 
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limitations such as battery power, memory, and computational capability (1, 19]. In order to optimize 
these sharing possibilities and to achieve pervasive environment-wide goals, we need to limit 
intrusions by malevolent entities. With increasingly transient and mobile environment where devices 
operate independently, the notion of a central authentication mechanism goes against the hue nature of 
a pervasive environment. Distributed trust mechanisms cart help distinguish which entities are 
trustworthy by sharing interaction experiences among devices. 
Trust in pervasive computing environments has been defmed by many researchers (37, 18, 8] from 
a number of different perspectives. Gambetta (8] defines trust as the probability of doing something 
benevolent by a trusted party A for the lmstee party B. Almenarez et al. [18] describe tmst as "the 
belief that an entity bas about other entity, from past experiences, knowledge about the entity's ilalure 
and/or recommendations from trusted entities. This belief expresses an expectation on the entity's 
behaviour, which implies a risk'' [12]. The level of trust value is normally used in order to make a risk-
takitlg decision as stated by Mayer et al. [37]: "lithe level of trust surpasses the tlu·eshold of perceived 
risk, tben the trustor wiJI engage in the risk-taking." 
Most tmst research focuses on entities and takes into account overall interactions across entities 
but disregards the natme of interactions, i.e., the actual service or content exchanged. This is 
important, since each service has associated security levels (23], and for each securi ty level, the service 
provider will have varied opinions regarding a requester's reputation. In this paper, we look beyond 
actor-interactions and consider service-transactions for trust evaluation. 
In this paper, we design and implement DIRT, a distributed trust-model and an extension ofSSRD 
[23]. It has been named after the word 'dirt', which means private or personal information which if 
made public would create a scandal or min the reputation of a person, company, etc. [35). Tmst 
evaluation in DIRT requires initial trust estimation, trust-inference from other service-tmst values for 
that device, recommendations from neighboring devices, and direct tmst experience. A service 
provider (SP) assigns a tmst value to a service requester (SR) for each category of services. We map 
services to different security levels and the tmst estimation varies for each level of security. The initial 
trust value is critical for tmst models to work effectively (34]. Most of the previous works [40], 
including our own work (23, 15, 26] used fixed tmst values representing a service provider's initial 
disposition to tmst, while some works tried to infer initial tmst values from similar and known contexts 
(17]. For initial trust estimation, an SR needs to provide context data and must answer the relevaut 
questions. Recommended trust among entities depends on a simple rule: take minimum reconunended 
trust .fi'om the most valued recommender. Direct trust value depends on an SP's satisfaction level for 
an SR. Overall trust also infers ratings from other services that SR has accessed previously. We 
provide a perfonnance analysis of our model evaluated witll the help of OmNet++ (32) for various 
scenarios. For perfonnance evaluation, we model a healtbcare-monitoring application and a location-
based service prototype. 
We organize our paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the desired characteristics of a trust model 
that we have tried to achieve in our proposed model. Section 3 describes related research on tmst, and 
compares and contrasts our proposed model with various other models. Section 4 si\Ows the 
architectme of DIRT, and Section 5 presents the detail operation of DIRT. Section 6 presents an 
illustrative example to explain the operation of DlRT. ln Section 7, we present simulation results with 
86 Architecture and Implementation of a trust Model for Pervasive Applications 
various scenarios using OmNet++ and a prototype implementation. We conclude with Section 8 by 
providing some future directions. 
2 Cha.-acteristics of the Trust Model 
Most pervasive computing environments depend on sharing of services. For that, SRs make requests to 
SP for a service. Based on the tmstworthiness of the requested device, the SP accepts or rejects. In this 
section, we discuss some scenarios attd the desired characteristics of a trust model required for 
effective sharing of services. 
Scenario I: John is a business analyst and commuter on a subway train to his office located in New 
York. Generally, his travel time to reach his office takes lhr 30min. During his commute, John 
received a phone call indicating he has to attend a meeting Lll the office. For the meeting, he has to 
have some data ready. Since required infonnation is in his email, he wants to check his email 
immediately. However, John does not have any internet service with his cell phone, and he wants to 
request service from any nearby devices. 
Scenario 2: Andy visited the national historic museum of New York. The museum is so big that he 
will not be able to cover the whole museum within the time he has. Therefore, he would like to know 
about the important places to visit in the museum and some infomtation about the performances that 
take place from time to time. He wants to get this infonuation by chatting with someone who has 
already visited most of the museum. 
Scenario 3: Dr. Jones, a resident doctor in a hospital, has fourteen patients in his care. He needs to 
pass detailed information about all of his patients to his on-call colleague Dr. Smith. Dr. Jones uses his 
hand-held device to write all the patient information, and with a healthcare application, Dr. Jones can 
simply transmit his patients' data from his handheld device to Dr. Smith who is working somewhere 
else in the medical center. Dr. Jones also makes his observations and comments about the patients 
available to the associated doctors instantly and· effortlessly with the use of healthcare application 
assuming that other doctor's devices are trusted. 
From the above scenarios, it is clear that the sharing of services in a pervasive network requires the 
device to be trusted. Moreover, the tmst values are also not the same for all seJVices. For example, the 
requesting and sharing of an intemet service in Scenario 1 has a trust value and risk that is more than 
the chat application in Scenario 2. In Scenario 3, the doctor's device has to be trusted in order to share 
the infonnation. As indicated in the scenarios, we encompass the following characteristics that are 
desired from a trust model used in a pervasive environment. 
Dynamic 
Tmst value is dynamic in the sense that it has different values depending on the service requested 
and the past behaviour of the requester. For each service, service provider needs past relevant context 
infonnation to make an inference about the present reputation or trust value. 
Paula's note- you talk frequently about context infomtation but up to tl1is point in the paper it's 
unclear to me what you mean. At this point in reading, I skipped to Context Awareness and that 
helped. Perhaps you could move Context Awareness up and list under Dynamic. Or perhaps Context 
Information needs its own explanation. 
S. I. Ahamed, M. Zulkemine, S. Bulusu, and M. Monjur 87 
Risk Awareness 
To have more security in a pervasive envjronment, tmst and risk always come baud in hand. Since 
tJJe value of tmst is not the same for all services, in service-oriented applications there is some risk 
involved when sharing services from one device to the other based on the calculated fnlst. 
Adaptive Reconunendation 
As the service provider ca1mot have the trust values for all the services, it needs to depend on other 
devices in the network during the calculation of a tmst value for the servjce requester. The tmst values 
may increase or decrease with further experience. 
Reliable Initial Trust 
Whenever a new device joins the network, we use the user of the device's context infonnation 
Depending on the service it will use, we calculate the initial tmst value for the device. This value 
evolves over time as we get more acquainted, and we get more reconu11endations from other devices in 
the network. 
Resource Efficient 
Devi.ces in a pervasive smart space like PDAs, cell phones, smart phones etc. have very low 
battery power and memory. Our model uses simple equations and an easy communication model to 
build tmst and propagate it. 
Context Awareness 
A tmst value mainly depends on only one context, i.e., service request For initial value 
calculation, we consider context vah1es like location, age, time, number of times service requested, etc. 
Service-Oriented 
A trust value is not the same among all devices for the different services categories. Each service 
requires different trust levels depending on security levels. 
3 Related Work 
In this section, we analyze each of the tmst models with respect to the characteristics described in 
Section 2. Table I shows the comparison table for the related models. From the table, it is clear how 
our model is different from the other models. 
Haque et al. (15] introduce a mechanism for handling multi-hop recommendations and at the same 
time, provide a unique way when COJISidering contexts as vectors for trust calculation. Quercia et al. 
[7] show how mobile devices store a very limited subset of the intricacies of tmst and modelled graph-
based semi-supervised learning scheme. Here, trust is not dependent on context and any node can 
make public the .ratings of a ll other nodes . In (34), they model a novel mechanism, named TRULLO 
(TRUst bootstrapping by Latently Lifting cOntext). TRULLO statistically analyzes the ratings of its 
users' pnst experiences to bootstrap unknown trust values and it relies only on Jocal infonnation. 
Therefore, TRULLO does not need to collect recommendations. 
Sharmin et al. in their service discovery protocol SSRD [23) present a resource discovery and 
tmst-based model which is developed to ensure security in a pervasive computing environment. The 
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trust model is a service specific model rather than device specific, which means that tbe same trust 
value is not used for all services. The trust value depends on the specific requester, the service 
requested, and the security level of the se.rvice. The model also has a prototype implementation for 
calculating the tmsl values. Based on these trust values, the service provider can decide whether the 
service is offered. While the model considers average tmst value (which is given as an initial trust 
value for the newly joined device), no specific method is provided to achieve the reliable initial trust 
value. The SSRD+ [28) (extension of SSRD) focuses on the dynamic tn1st relationships of the devices 
while not having any perfonnance degradation. They include trust and risk models for sJ1aring senrices. 
The idea to include the risk model is to protect the network from malicious devices. Even though they 
include the risk model for an u1tknown device, they do not address how the reliable initial trust value is 
achieved as well as how the trust value changes with the context. They evaluate this model by 
implementing the prototype and using simulation tool OMNeT++ for the performance of the model. 
Novel cloud model [36) focuses oo the uncertainly between entities, refening to the trust between 
the entities as cloud. Further, they propose a cloud-based trust model which helps to put the model into 
real time and make the trust decisions in security-based mechanisms in a pervasive computing 
environment. They did not address how the trust decision is changed along time, nor is location 
addressed in this model. They did not mention the risk involved when a new device jo.ins the network. 
Their focus is not towards having a reliable initial trust value and using the resources efficiently. 
The PTM model [12] is a decentralized trust model based on a public key used in the 
·infrastructure-Jess environment. Their main focus is on the dynamic behavior of the entities and the 
exchange of trust infom1ation by using reconunendation protocol. Further, they did not address any 
risk and context in forming the model. However, they validated lbe model using the security level and 
variable parameter with respect to the trust values with the help of the behavior of the entity. The main 
focus of this model is to reduce the human intervention in calculating the trust. Yet they did not have 
the concept of initial tmst value. Further they addressed risk assessment in a model [14). However, this 
model is not service-oriented since all of the services for a specific device have the same trust value. 
The service discovery protocol [13) is based on PTM (12). They incorporate tbe tmst in this 
protocol to gel the trustworthy services from other devices. This protocol doesn't require any 
centralized server., The need for a se1ver is eliminated by the \lse of components, user agents and a 
se1vice agent. In addition, they address how the trust value is changed with the positive and negative 
experiences within the specific context. One of the pitfalls of this protocol is that the user agent of the 
device keeps on listening for the broadcasting messages and this consumes resources. The risk analysis 
is not used. Instead a security model is inco1porated to work with the security levels of the services 
and to achieve security issues like mutual authentication, data integrity and confidentiality based on the 
level of trust. 
English et al. [5] present a dynamic model, which supports reconunendation trust. This model 
caplt1res the dynamic aspects of Ute trust formation and evolution, and it considers human decisions in 
order to reduce the security vulnerabilities. The dynamic aspects of this model include trust formation, 
evolution, and exploitation. As a part of this project, the model being developed addresses the 
characteristics like context awareness and risk awareness. 
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In autonomic trust [2 1 ], the authors address the following issues: the autonomic ability of the 
model, the burden imposed on the user's device when the model is used, and the usage of large amount 
of user i11put and physicAl resources in computing the trust. This model overcomes the Above 
mentioned issues by htcluding An accurate and efficient trust predictor which is based on a basic 
Kalman filter. With the Kalman filter, they derive an autonomic, lightweight ru1d thus the trust 
predictor in pervasive computing scenarios. In addition to the derivAtion of the trust predictor, the 
simulation results are also given to evaluate the performance of the trust predictor's behavior. 
Social trust (3] is based on the social certificate for trust negotiation by using the secure tntst 
negotiation agent (STNA). This model also uses the trust negotiation protocol in order to establish a 
trust relationsl1ip betvveen the entities. To overcome the disadvantages of reconunendation tntst, this 
model used a property-based trust. In the property-based model, during the process, the two entities 
which are trying to establish the tmst relationship need to agree about the activity on which they want 
to build the trust relation. Then the tn tst negotiation protocol is used to build the tmst relatjonship. This 
model is basically developed for peer to peer environments that can be adapted to the pervasive 
computing environments. 
Model Dynamic Risk Adaptive Reliable Resource Context Service-
Awareness Recommc Initial efficient Awareness Oriented 
ndation trust 
PTM[I2] y NA y N y NA NA 
SSRD[23] y N y N y N y 
SSRD+[37) y y y N y N y 
SPDP(1 3] y N N NA y NA y 
NCM[36] y N NA NA N N N 
B-trustf6] y p y N y NA N 
ST[3l y NA y NA N NA NA 
AT[21] y NA NA p y NA NA 
DTM [5] NA .P y N NA y N 
TF£421 y N y N NA NA N 
TAG [39] y NA y N NA y NA 
RTM£41 NA y N N NA NA NA 
DIRT y NA y y y NA y 
Table I Compatrison Tnble (Y - Yes, N - No, NA - Not Addressed, P - Partial) 
The trust fi·amework (42] ]Presents a model which can be used in both 'purely adhoc environments' 
and 'managed ad hoc environments'. The focus of this model is to categorize the device based on the 
security functionalities and the~ resources available for that device. The quantification of !ntsl is done 
by using a recommendation value in this model. This model also has a scenAtio to show the calculation 
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of trust values for number of malicious devices and other specific devices such as devices with low 
battery power, etc. 
The risk-based trust model [4] is an approach to integrate security and risk management with the 
help of a trust model, which in tum gain1s utility maximization. The objective of this model is not only 
to eliminate malicious devices but also to a llocate permissions for the legitimate devices based ou the 
risk levels. This model has developed a qualitative approach for integrating risk and security by using 
trust as a mediator. This trust model is invoked before the authorization module. If the value of the 
trust is lower than the threshold value, the11 it will be evaluated by the authorization module which in 
tttrn results in utility maximization. There is no approach given for the calculation of risk values and 
initial trust values. They use a mobile agent system as an example to study the approach. 
The trust analysis grid (39] presents a hust analysis methodology and guidelines to design a 
pervasive computing system. Various trust issue categories from different aspects of the pervasive 
computing scenarios are listed in the fbrm of a grid. The tntst issue is categorized into Lhe fo llowing 
groups: 1) Data categories - this group describes the property of the data. 2) System categories - this 
group describes the components and services of the system that can be used in the pervasive scenario. 
3) Subjective categories - this group includes the categories which are related to the internal state and 
knowledge of the device. 
They validate aud analyze the scenarios. Then they peer review and refine the scenarios. Finally, 
they formalize the guidelines. This approach does not address any risk analysis issues; ratl1er it does 
consider some context aware properties. TI1ey do the validation with the help of agent-based systems 
by which they achieve the dynamic property of the trust. 
B- trust [6] is a distributed trust evaluation mechanism based on direct experience and 
recommendations. The whole process is dependent on the Bayesian fonnali zation. Further, this model 
is robust to withstand the common attacks and thus supports the user anonymity. II is lightweight and 
does not include context awareness OJ" the idea of calculating the initial trust for newly joined devices. 
They integrate risk awareness, while there is no mechanism for calculating the risk. Finally, this model 
shows positive results on packet delive1y when some of the devices act as malicious devices. 
4 DIRT Architecture 
DIRT has a component-based architecture (See Figure 1 and 2). It has the following main components: 
Service Manager (SM), Direct Trust Builder (DTB), Recommendation Trust Builder (RTB), 
Recommended Value Accumulator (RYA), Initial Trust Calculator (lTC), and Update Manager (UM). 
Service Manager (SM): The Service Manager of each device contains a list of tmst values of all 
the neigl1boring devices for each service. Before Utat, SM maps each service to relevant security level 
[23) (See Table ll) .. It is represented as SM (device_id, service_name, trust_ value, security_Jevel). 
Direct Tmst Builder (DTB): Upon experiencing a transaction with a requester, a SP (Service 
Provider) assings its satisfaction level. In order to share the service with the SR (Service Receiver), SP 
checks its trust list that is maintained by the SM and lTC. lt uses both present and past direct trust 
values in calculating a new trust value. 
S. l Ahmned, M Zulkemine. S. Bulusu, and M Monjur 91 
Recommendation Tntst Builder (RTB): 111is component is invoked when an SP does not have any 
previous interaction with an SR. Jo building the tn1st value with the SR (a ttew device in this case), as 
an initial step, SP must assign some initial tmst value for SR which is done by JTC. In the next step, 
the RVA requests reconunendation values from the neighboring devices and accumulates tmst value 
for each service. 
Recommended Value Accumulator (RVA): The RV Accumulato1· of a device gels all the 
recommendation values from the neighboring devices in the network. These values are used in 
calculating the direct tmst in case of a known device and the reconunended tmst in case of a new 
device. Furthermore, RV A is responsible for the process of bow the recommendation values are 
transferred from one device to the other. 
Initial Trust Calculator (ITC): The ITC component of our model is invoked when a new device 
joins the nehvork. This component assigns a tntSt value for a newly joined device in order to allow it 
communicate with other devices in the neighborhood and thus share services. 
Update Manager (UM): The task of the UM is to calculate the total ttust value for each service 
(Equation 5) and also total trust vnlue without considering services (Equation 6). Jt updates the tmst 
values in the SM whenever an interaction occurs. Once the tmst values are calculated (either direct or 
recommended), it updates the tmst/service list which is represented as UM (device_id, service_name, 
tmst_ value). 
= : :;:; ·=~ 
ApJ>liCA tion Instauees J) 
Security Set'vice 
Corumun.ic.ation Sen ·ke 
Cor e Sen·ice 
DIRT ) 
MJmll9] u 
Figure 1: Architecture of MARKS {21] with DIR1' 
The components of the architecture are shown in Figure 2. When an SR (in case it is a new device 
and does not have any previous interactions with art SP) requests a service, the SM of the SP is 
invoked. Then RTB is called, followed by ITC and RV A in order to c11lcnlate the initial trust value and 
to accumulate the recommendations from the neighboring devices of the nehvork respectively. Once 
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Sen rlc:e l\lanage,r 
DTB 0 RTB j 
RVA a ITO u 
Upd11te l\bnager 
Figure 2: Components of DIRT 
5 DlRT Operation 
DIRT uses ITC to build i11itial tmst, RTB to evaluate recommended trust, DTB to estimate direct tmst 
experience, and UM to calculate overall tmst with and without considering service. DIRT uses SM to 
categorize services to different security levels. 
To calculate initial trust value, SM categorizes each service into different security-levels. Each 
security level has some requirements that SR needs to fu lfill to access the service .in that category. 
Requirements include relevant context information and four questions-answers. When a new device 
joins the network without any previous service request, initial tmst value is calculated usil1g Equation 
La. Again, if SR's service request is new but previously had low security-level service interaction, the 
initial trust value depends on previous average initial tntst as well as meetil1g other requirements, 
according to Equation 1 b. 
RV A acquires a ll the recommended value from neighbouring devices. RTB makes recommended 
bust assignment using the statement: take mininmm recommended value from most valued 
recommender. This is similar in natme to Advogato [38] calculation of recommended trust where 
"between any two nodes, the quantity of trust flowing from one node to another cannot be greater than 
the weakest rating somewhere on the path between the two nodes". Again, if there is no 
reconuueudation, RTB uses only inilialtrust value from lTC. 
DTB calculates direct trust value for each service using SP's satisfaction level of SR and also takes 
into account old direct ltust ratings. 
UM calculates total trust value for each service considering three thil1gs, a) influence of total tntst 
for other services, b) reconU1lended llltst value and c) direct tmsl experience. Finally, update manager 
also calculates overalltn1st without considering service specificity which serves as a recommendation 
for other devices. 
5.1 JTC- New Device Enters h1to the Environment 
For each service, an SR requires a tmst value to access and use the service. Initial Tmst Calculator 
(lTC) comes into play when there is no h"Ust value for a SR for a service. lndeed, there may be cases 
when SR had other service experience with SP but not for this particular service for which JTC is 
invoked. We use the table of [23] and extended it (see Table II) to categorize services according to 
S. l Aluuned, M Zrtlkernine, S. Bulusu, and M Monjur 93 
their security leveL SR needs to have a trust value more than 0.5 per security level to access services in 
that category. We use two parts to calculate initial trust: 1) Initial Trust Calculation and 2) Initial 
Requirement. Ini tial requirement includes question-answer requirements and context requirements. 
PART 1: Initial Trust Calculation 
Before providing a detail description ofiTC algorithm, we define the following terms: 
Ts
11 
(SP, SR) = Trust value of SP in SR for accessing security level n services (See Equation 7). 
Tavo = Average weighted-trust value for security-levels less than n. 
II 
TS[J, 2, ... , 10] = An array having all the trust value for the 10 security levels 
= { 7~1 , Ts 2, ... Ts10 } 
We calculate Tavg with the following equation: 
II 
T '("n-1 ( · T )/"'n-1 · avg 11 = L-1=1 L • S£ Ll= t L. 
Here is the algorithm where SR requiJ·es security n-level tntst: 
STEP 1: lfn is in {1, 2, 3, 4} and satisfies PART 2, Ts
11
= 0.5. {la) 
STEP2:Ifn >= 5andTavg >= 0.5andsatisfiesPART2,thenTs = 0.5 (lb) n n 
What STEP2 does is permit accessing higher level services. If SR does not have any required 
average trust value for a lower level service, SR catmot ask for a higher level service and access it right 
away. SR can access services of level 1,2,3 and 4 by fulfil ling STEPl and with that, SR will have 
direct trust value. If SR performs okay in these levels, he has now chance to fulfill STEP2 and access 
higher level services. 
PART 2: Initial Requirement 
ln this part, we present some requirements for SR to satisfy. As we observed in the previous 
section that PART 2 requirements are pre-requisites for an initial trust calculation, we l1ave two 
requirements: I) give answers to prepared questions and 2) give relevant context data. 
STEP 1. Context Requirement: 
Se1·vice Manager (SM) categorizes each service and maps it into the security level table. We used 
the table (i·om [23] and we added some context requirement that SR needs lo ful fill to have ITC work. 
Each device will define his satisfactory context domain. Hence, SR fiJst needs to pass the context 
requirement of the pre-defined context domain. For example, to use a chat software, SR may need to 
be available in the smart space at least 5 times in a week. Again, if SR asks for a MIME type which SP 
does not provide or find it critical, SR wm not pass this phase. 
STEP 2. Question Requirement: 
For accessing services in security levels 1 to 4, we emphasize the answering of four questions. 
Depending on the answers, we provide a value using function rVO from 0.1 to 0.5. (0.1 means 
dependency is minimum and 0.5 means dependency is maximum). 
The questions are as follows: 
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Ql. How frequently is the service used by the device? 
Q2. Where does the device need the service? For example, the services which can be used by 
students frequently in a school environment have lower values than other services. 
Q3. How many times is the service requested by the requester? 
Q4. How matt1y devices can provide the recommendations for that newly joined device? 
The response: value to each answer from the SR is used to evaluate (rV). Now, the initial trust 
value of the SR for service i can be calculated as follows: Ti{SR) = ( rV(Ql)+rV(Q2)+ rV(Q3) + 
rV(Q4))/4. 
Service Name Security Level (1-1 0) Context R<?Ctuirement 
Dateffime 1 n/a 
Weather 1 n/a 
WordPad, PDA Viewer 2 n/a 
Chat software 4 Location, Fr<?Ctuen~of visit in the smm1 ~1ce 
... .. . ... ... 
······ ··· 
Location Service 7 location 
Healtheare Service 8 Age, location 
Internet $(:rvicc 9 Location, Round Trip Time, MIME 
Address book 10 location, fr<?CtucnSY_ of visit in the smart ~ace. 
Table II List of services with associated security level and context requirement 
5.2 RVA - Transferring recommendation values 
The idea of having an Recommended Value Accumulator (RVA) component is to get the 
recommendation values from all neighboring devices. If a new device requests a service from another 
device and SP does not have any previous interaction with SR, then SP requests recommendations 
from the neighboring devices. The message format for requesting the recommendations from the 
neighboring devices is: Reco_request (SP, SR_id, service_name, WT) SR_id is a service requester id, 
and WT is the waiting lime that SP can wait for the recommendation. Once the request is received by 
the neighboring device, it responds with the recommendation value within WT time. If SP does not 
receive the recommendation withi11 WT, it means that the neighboring device does not have the 
reconunendation value for the SR. The message fonnat for the response is: Reco_response (SP, SR_ id, 
service_name, rec:o_ value, WT). 
5.3 RTB - Recommended Tmst Calculation 
Recommendation Trust Builder (RTB) uses RVA to gather recommendation values and uses the initial 
trust value fi·om lTC. We have two part to the calculation, first, we calculate the recommended value 
for a service i and second, we calculate recommended trust. 
STEP 1. Reconunended Value Calculation: 
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We calculate the recommended value for SR in SP for service 1 in three steps: 
Find the set r of devices where for each device ,., in r the ttust value in device SP is maximum. 
r E Max(1(SP, x}}, where x is the set of all the devices in the enviromnent. 
Find the minimum trust value of SR for service i in the set of device r. 
RV =Min (T(t~ SR)) (2) 
T (A, B) = Trust value of device B in device A for service. 
STEP 2, Recmmnended Trust Calculation: 
RTB consults Service Manager (SM) and learns the security-level of serv.ice i. If service i has 
security Ievell, then recommended trust value for service I is: 
. {(T51 + RV)/2, where RV :t. 0 
Tr( SP, SR, t) = T
51
, othe1wise. (3) 
TrC A, 8, i) = recommended trust value of device B in device A for service I. 
5.4 DTB - Direct Trust Calculation 
Direct Trust Builder (DTB) assigns SP's satisfaction level with SR as it interacts with SP. This direct 
tmst level depends on a current satisfaction level and past direct experience. Direct tmst is important 
s ince it does not depend on the recommendations of other trusted neighbors. The work in [15] uses a 
similar way to calculate direct trust. 
Tct( SP, SR, i) = o c 2 , if the1·e is previous experience {
Tct "(SP, SR,i) +• 
• , otherwise 
Tc~( SP, SR, i) = direct trust value ofSR in SP for service i. 
Tc~01d( SP, SR, i) =old direct trust value ofSR in SP for service i 
-r: = SP's satisfaction level ofSR from direct experience. 
5.5 Update Manager - Total Trust Calculation 
(4) 
Update Manager (UM) calculates total trust for each service request by aggregating trust values fi·om 
DTB and RTB. The total actual tmst for a service makes use of tmst-inference from other service-trust 
values for that device, recommendations from neighboring devices, and direct trust experience. 
'f.j:1 T(SP,SR,j) w1 x - + w2 x T,.(SP,SR,i) + w3 x Tc~(SP,SR,i) T(SP,SR,i) = ____ __!_n!.!;_t _ _ _ ___ _________ _ 
wl + Wz + w3 
(5) 
T( A, 8, i) = total tmst value of Device B in device A for se1v ice i. 
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w1 = weight for trust inference from other accessed services. 
w2 = weight for recommended trust. 
w3 = weight for direct trust. 
Update Manager also calculates the overall trust for SR in device SP without considering any 
service. This value is useful because it will serve as the recommendation for other devices regarding 
SR. 
T ( S p, S R ) = ~r. lt..:::.'~~l 1_'(;...s_P._sn_.t..:..) 
n 
(6) 
Update Manager calculates SP's trust level of SR for secmity n level services. ITC also use this 
calculation while putting initial tmst value to higher security levels. 
T. (SP SR) = 'f.ten T(SP,SR,l) (7) s,, , p 
Tsn (SP, SR) = Trust value of SP in SR for accessing security level n services. 
p = number of services in security leveln. 
6 Jllustl'ative Example 
In this section, we present how our model works in one scenario described in Section 2. For Scenario 
3, in which Dr. Jones is requesting for a healthcare service. let us suppose that there are other people, 
say A, B, and C, in the network and Dr. Jones is requesting a healthcare: service of security-level 8 (See 
Table II). A has that service and is able to p rovide that service to Dr. Jones. However, as device A does 
not have any previous interaction with Dr. Jones, it needs to calculate an initial tmst value as well as 
recommended trust value. It takes the recommendations from B and C, which are 0.5 and 0.7 
respectively, as well as A's tmst value forB and C which are 0.7 and 0.8, respectively. Because Cis 
the most valued recommender of A, the recommendation value for Or. Jones is 0.7 (Equation 2). 
Device A needs to calculate an initialtmst value for Or. Jones when he js asking for security-level 
9 service. As Dr. Jones has no previous average-weighted-initia l-trust value for lower level security, he 
wi ll have no initial security-level 9 tmst assignment. Hence, T59 = 0.0 (Equation 1 b). This mea11s Dr. 
Jones has recommended tmst Tr(A, Dr. Jones, hea/thcare service) = (0.0+0.7)/2= 0.35 (Equation 3) 
with direct trust Td (A, Or. Jones, healthcare service) = 0.0 (Equation 4). TJ1is makes the total tmst 
value, T{A, Dr. Jones, healthcare service) = (25* 0.0 + 25*0.35 + 50 * 0.0)/100 = .07 (Equation 5) 
which means Dr. Jones will not get the service. 
Instead, if DL Jones provides his context infonnation and answers t·he questions, he will be given 
T51 = Ts2 = T53 =Ts4 =0.5 (Equation Ia). This means that he can start thinking of accessing se1vices of 
security-level 1, 2, 3, and 4. His tmst value will again be calculated for those setvices, and if it 
becomes greater than 0.5, he can access that se1vice. As Dr. Jones accesses a lower security level 
service, we can calculate his direct tmst value (see equation 4), his tmst value for that service (see 
equation 5), his total tmst (see equation 6), and his tmst value for that security level (see equation 7). 
Now Dr. Jones will be more reliable to A and is more likely to satisfy equation lb aud access his 
desired healthcare service. 
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7 Evaluation 
We have evaluated our model using OmNet++ simulation tool with which we could measure the 
performance of the model. We varied the number of devices in the network to measure the 
perfonnance. The graphs in this section were generated by using the simulation tool OmNet++ in 
which X - axis representing the number of devices in the network and Y - axis representing the 
response time for the simulation. We used different tmst values for different devices and also for 
different services. We observed the model by varying the initial trust values and recommendation 
values. Figure 3 shows the graph for varying the initial trust values. ln the graph, we observe that the 
values are the same for all the four series (each series represents the change in the value of initia l 
trust). The similarity is due to not changing the mobility of the devices. We then tried to change the 
mobility of the devices, and this difference is d isplayed in the graph in Figure 4. The graph explains 
that when the requester is nearer to the service provider, the response time wi ll be less. The node which 
is fatthest from the provider has the higher response time. We also observed the behavior of the model 
for 10 devices in the network by changing the delay in broadcasting the packets. Figure 5 represents 
the graph for varying the delay in broadcasting. Finally, we observed the efficiency and scalability of 
the model by changing the number of devices iu the network. l~igure 6 represents this scenario. The 
representation of this graph depends on the number of devices that could give recommendations in 
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Figure 4: Changing the mobility of the devices 
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We also developed the trust model on Dell Axim Pocket PC 50v using C#.NET compact 
framework. In addition, we developed a healthcare application [29] for the PDAs of nmses, doctors, 
and patients which use our trust model. We also implemented a location service prototype and used 
our trust model to evaluate DJRT's effectiveness. Indeed, location infonnation is static and placed in 
an xml file. The idea was to implement it over our trust model. It is a prototype application of 
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Power consumption is one of the most important perfonnance metrics of pervasive computing 
applications and s<~rvices. Our heallhcare application along with the trust model seems to be very 
power-conservative. It consumes the minimal amount of battery power possible. Figure 8 establishes 
this as a tme statement. Here, we have shown two cases for each PDA: the idle case (when tbe PDA 
is ON but not doing anything) and the active case (when the application is running on the PDA). 
8 Conclusion and Future Work 
Instead of having a constant notion of initial trust value, our model showed how categorizing services 
into security levels, context infonnation, and a simple questiorUJaire can decide initial trust. Our model 
uses recommendations from neighboring devices, direct trust experience, and inference from other 
service-trust values for that device to estimate the overall trust value. We defmed characteristics of the 
pervasive environment and showed how these characteristics are satisfied in our model. Further, we 
reviewed the existing trust models and provided a comparison table with respect to the characteristics. 
Finally, we observed the performance of the model using OmNet·H- simulation tool and implemented a 
prototype of health care and location~based service over our tmst model. 
In the future, we will work to categorize services more effectively and broadly according to 
different security-levels. We also plan to devise a communication-protocol to provide and share this 
classification data over a pervasive environment so that trust can be based on generic service-security-
levels. We also need to map relevant context to each service category. 
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